ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE 32

U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
12 August 1985

Why Americans Become Kremlin Agents

By Stansfield Turner, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 1977-81

Why do Americans spy against their country? There are five basic motivations, though most cases involve more than one. The most frequent inducement is money. From time immemorial, men and women have sold their countries' secrets for money. That's quite understandable, since citizens who are granted a security clearance are, in effect, being given a salable commodity. Such individuals may seek out a foreign agent with whom they can make a deal, or they may be enticed by an offer of money made by a foreign-intelligence operative. In either case, they suppress whatever qualms they may have about being traitors to their country and fears about being apprehended and prosecuted. Often greed alone is sufficient to push aside either of these inhibitions, though for many some added incentive is necessary.



DARRYL HEIKES—USN&WR

One added incentive to do this is the appeal of a political ideology such as Communism. We are accustomed to thinking of examples from the 1930s or even '40s and '50s when some intellectuals saw Communism as the wave of the future. By 1985, Communist ideology has lost much of its appeal, and we have not seen comparable cases recently. Still, the danger is always there, in part because Soviet agents in this country have the freedom to meet and mingle with Americans, and younger, impressionable individuals can sometimes be swayed.

In contrast, it is so obvious that our ideology is superior to Communism that many of the Soviets who spy against their country do so without having to be persuaded that ours is a better cause.

Disillusions—and thrills. Another motivating factor that can tip the scales for someone tempted to spy against our country is disillusionment with our society or government. Christopher Boyce, who was apprehended for spying in 1976, professed that he was shocked by what he learned of CIA operations overseas while he worked in the secret coding room of an industrial contractor. He alleges that made him turn traitor. Fortunately, not many Americans have spied because of a feeling of hopelessness and discontent with our system. There are few groups or individuals in our country who feel that they do not have a reasonable recourse within the system. In contrast, in the Soviet-bloc resentment at the repressive and arbitrary system is a key force driving people to turn traitor.

Still another consideration that can tip an honest person into being a traitor is psychological fulfillment. Usually, this is a need to find excitement or a sense of power and control. Robert Lindsey, who has written two books on the Christopher Boyce case, says of Boyce that "he must have betrayed his country for excitement." The recent case of John Walker indicates that he derived a lot of satisfaction from bringing others into his alleged spying schemes and directing their efforts. Once out of the Navy, he went to work as a private eye and acted like a James Bond, wearing disguises and setting up elaborate schemes to catch people in compromising circumstances. The popularity of spy novels and movies today has been a factor in ensnaring people into what they think will be an exciting new life of spying. Psychological satisfaction, though, is by no means a new phenomenon. The famous Sidney Reilly, "Ace of Spies" at the turn of this century, was a man who sold himself to various governments and clearly gained satisfaction not only from making money but from manipulating people and governments as well.

Finally, other individuals spy because they are blackmailed, usually because of money problems or sex. Phillip Agee may well be a case in point. He left the Central Intelligence Agency because of severe personal problems, but did so with regret. As his problems grew worse, however, he turned up in Havana, where there's a reasonable possibility that he traded secrets for whatever financial and other assistance he needed. Agee, once having become a traitor, would have found, as they all do, that there is no turning back. The Soviets will always apply the threat of exposure to keep their agents working.

Remote eavesdropping. Still another change in spying is that the use of technical devices is becoming more important. We know the Soviets collect information inside the United States by extensive use of technical systems. There are, for example, arrays of antennas on the Soviet Embassy in Washington and their consulates in New York, San Francisco and Chicago to intercept domestic telephone calls transmitted by microwave. They have placed a huge antenna in northwest Cuba to intercept telephone calls relayed by satellite across the United States. We have repeatedly found our embassy in Moscow penetrated, first with bugs in the great seal of the United States behind the ambassador's desk, then with 52 hidden microphones throughout the embassy, next with a special antenna in a chimney and recently with devices for picking up weak signals from typewriter keys. Our embassy there is vulnerable because, as in our other embassies, we rely heavily on local employes to perform most of the menial chores. In Moscow, however, we cannot even select the employes but must take those whom the Soviet government assigns to us, undoubtedly after training by the KGB.

The face of spying is, indeed, changing. We will have to adapt our countering techniques by placing more emphasis on uncovering technical systems that steal our secrets and by being more alert to detecting swashbuckling adventurers who spy for kicks.

Admiral Turner is the author of the recent book, Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition.

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE A-3

NEW YORK TIME
10 August 198

White House Aid to Nicaraguan Rebels Reportedly Worried C.I.A.

By JOEL BRINKLEY
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 9 — The National Security Council's direct involvement with the Nicaraguan rebels in the last year caused "some disquiet" among Central Intelligence Agency officials who feared the activities might be illegal, a senior Administration official said today.

The official, who asked not to be identified, said the Director of Central Intelligence, William J. Casey, "hasn't wanted to know some of the things the N.S.C. was doing because of the Boland amendment."

He was referring to legislation originally sponsored by Representative Edward P. Boland, Democrat of Massachusetts, that restricted or prohibited direct American aid to the Nicaraguan rebels. The legislation expired Thursday.

A White House spokesman, Edward P. Djerejian, in a reference to the anti-Sandinista rebels, said today that "our relationship with the democratic resistance is conducted entirely within the letter and the spirit of the law."

Administration officials have acknowledged that in the last year, after Congress prohibited direct American aid to the Nicaraguan rebels, officers of the National Security Council were involved in the rebels' operations.

Reagan Defends Arrangement

On Thursday, President Reagan said the arrangement did not break any law, and some members of Congress who oppose the council's involvement with the rebels said they did not believe it was illegal.

Mr. Djerejian said the involvement with the rebels included "urging them to take all proper care of civilians and prisoners of war, giving advice on human rights matters" and "assuring that their conduct of the war must be part and parcel of their policy of establishing a democracy in Nicaragua."

It was reported this week that the council had provided direct military advice to the rebels and help in raising funds from private sources.

A senior White House official said, "We're not in the trenches giving tactical advice to the democratic resistance."

But in an interview, another senior White House official who has intimate knowledge of the National Security Council activities said the officer in charge of the program had detailed knowledge of how and where the rebels bought their weapons.

Details of Arms Purchases

The official said that the rebels bought most of their small arms, including AK-47 automatic rifles made in Poland and Bulgaria, at weapons markets in Belgium, France or West Germany, and that they have bought Soviet-made SA-7 surface-to-air missles "by the dozens" in recent months.

The White House official also said the National Security Council knew that the rebels had taken delivery of the arms in Honduras and Costa Rica. The use of those countries for such deliveries has made their Governments "nervous," the official said.

The National Security Council officer has made frequent trips to rebel camps and other locations in Central America, the senior Administration official said, "and he always has his own Government airplane."

"That's very unusual," the official added, "unless you are a Cabinet secretary."

He said some at the C.I.A. worried that the National Security Council had at times "stepped over the line."

'Some Grumbling' at C.I.A.

An intelligence official said there was "some grumbling" at the C.I.A. about the council's activities. "Some people didn't like it," he said, but he declined to elaborate.

In October, the C.I.A. issued a directive prohibiting agency employees from contact or involvement with the Nicaraguan rebels. But as part of his work with the rebels, the National Security Council officer was in frequent contact with the C.I.A., Administration officials said.

The concern over the legality of the National Security Council program involves the so-called Boland amendment limiting or prohibiting American involvement with the rebels. The first such legislation, sponsored by Mr. Boland, was approved in 1982. Subsequent measures with similar restrictions, although sponsored by other legislators, have continued to be known by Mr. Boland's name.

The limitation in effect since last year ended Thursday, when President Reagan signed a foreign aid bill providing $27 million in nonmilitary aid to the rebels. Any agency except the C.I.A. and the Defense Department may now be legally involved with the rebels. Intelligence and Defense Department officers are allowed to offer help, but only as consultants to other United States Government officers.

When it was in effect, the previous law said: "No funds available to the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense or any other agency or entity of the United States involved in intelligence activities may be obligated or expended" to support, "directly or indirectly, military or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua."

Mr. Djerejian said today that "during the period where no resources were provided by Congress, there was obviously no disposition of Federal funds."

Representative George E. Brown Jr., Democrat of California, a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, said he and other committee members had discussed the National Security Council activities but had concluded they could do little about them.

Still, he said, "I am kind of steamed about it because it is avoiding the intent of Congress."

Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence in the Carter Administration, called the council's activities "a devious and disingenuous technique" to skirt the law.

But Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was national security adviser for President Carter, said: "The N.S.C. is an instrument for enforcing the President's will. I don't have any objections to this."

ARTICLE APPE
ON PAGE A-4
NEW YORK TIMES
9 August 1985

ROLE IN NICARAGUA DESCRIBED BY U.S.

Administration Says Contacts With Rebels Were Legal

By GERALD M. BOYD
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Aug. 8 — The Reagan Administration acknowledged today that officials on the National Security Council were involved in the operations of the insurgents who are seeking to topple the Nicaraguan Government.

In providing the confirmation, officials and President Reagan said the Administration had not violated United States laws regulating covert operations or prohibiting direct American assistance to the rebels.

"We're not violating any laws," Mr. Reagan said in signing legislation that provides $27 million in nonmilitary assistance to the rebels over the next two years. The measure was part of a $25.4 billion foreign aid bill.

"I am particularly pleased that the Congress approved the renewal of aid to the Nicaraguan freedom fighters," he said before he signed the bill.

The involvement in covert operations in Nicaragua by the National Security Council, a branch of the White House, was criticized by members of Congress and some leading national security officials in past administrations.

"It just makes it unmistakably clear that it's our war," said Representative Anthony C. Beilenson, Democrat of California, a member of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. "They are waging it in every way except with American troops."

Reflecting similar concern, Adm. Stansfield Turner, Director of Central Intelligence under President Carter, said that "it's most improper" for the National Security Council to play a role similar to one that Congress had barred the Central Intelligence Agency from performing.

"It may not break the law," he said, "but it's ridiculous when the C.I.A. had to be kept at arm's length from the contras to have another arm of Government doing exactly the same thing."

The criticism came in response to a report today in The New York Times, attributed to senior Administration officials and members of Congress, that the rebels have been receiving direct military advice from National Security Council officials in an operation run by a military officer in the White House.

Official Explains Operation

A White House official who is intimately familiar with the operation said there was a perception in the Administration that Congress did not understand the feelings of Nicaragua's neighbors. Those countries "want constant reassurance," the official said.

This official explained the White House efforts by saying: "If the Soviet Union metaphysically is equated to an ancient, evil empire, then to the extent we can, we ought to attack it by going at the colonies. We don't do it well now. Central America is the first opportunity to do it right."

The Administration had first commented on the role of National Security Council officials at a morning press briefing. Reading a prepared statement, Larry Speakes, the White House spokesman, said contacts had been made but no laws had been broken.

"No member of the National Security Council staff has, at any time, acted in violation of either the spirit or the letter of existing legislation dealing with U.S. assistance to the democratic resistance in Nicaragua," he said.

"Contacts have been made from time to time for the purpose of receiving information and for fostering contacts," he added, "such as was done at the time the President met with the democratic resistance leaders."

He was referring to a dinner that Mr. Reagan attended in Washington in April to raise funds for the Nicaraguan Refugee Fund. The President pleaded then and later for Congress to approve assistance for the rebels.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
9 August 1985

LETTERS

Moral government

In "A chat with spydom's former chief" (July 17), Louise Sweeney quotes Adm. Stansfield Turner as calling morality-based criticism of covert CIA activities "flawed attempts to transform an idealized view of morality between individuals to a standard of morality between nations."

Presumably Admiral Turner prefers the pragmatic to the "idealized." But haven't millennia of history taught us that, in the long run (and the short run), nothing is more purely practical than morality-based thought and action? And why should governments be excused from morality any more than individuals are? Aren't they supposed to represent their citizen populations?

What is an individual citizen supposed to think when he sees his government engaged in an action which, if he were to do it on his own, might well lead him to Sing Sing or the chair? Double standards have tended to disrupt every group that has tried to live by them.

Carroll P. Cole
New Haven, Conn.